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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
Ownership structure with the reference to the comparative studies 
worldwide, types, forms and patterns identified in companies as well as 
the logic behind the behavior of different owners constitutes an important 
theme in management studies. Research reveals the crucial importance of 
the ownership patterns with the reference to the shareholder identity and 
concentration of shares for the standards of corporate governance 
including control and monitoring mechanisms, transparency, board work. 
Corporate governance literature indicates that certain shareholder types 
may have impact on the adoption of pyramidal structures, dual class 
shares, board independence, structure of executive compensation and 
disclosure.  
This paper focuses on the specific type of listed companies which remain 
under the control of the founder. The goal of the paper is to identify the 
corporate governance mechanisms adopted by founders in listed 
companies with respect to the way they exert control. It investigates 
whether founders tend to increase the control over companies via use of 
ownership mechanisms adopting dual class shares and pyramidal 
structures and via dominating the board lowering the number of 
independent directors.  Using the hand collected data of  a sample of 100 
companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange the paper addresses the 
gap in the literature of the unique form of ownership characterized by the 
control of the founders (first generation) who need to confront the 
entrepreneurial spirit and significant dominance in management and 
governance in the company with the features of listed companies in which 
ownership and control is shared among investors.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Ownership  structure remains the crucial company’s characteristics, belongs to the most 
important governance mechanisms, and delivers fundamental legacy for oversight and control 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The studies on ownership structure 
patterns, dynamics and characteristics help understand the directions of strategic development 
of companies (Demsetz and Keith, 1985). Research reveals the crucial importance of the 
ownership patterns with the reference to the shareholder identity and concentration of shares 
for the standards of corporate governance including the aspects to transparency, board 
independence and composition, board committees, the incentive function of executive 
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compensation. Corporate governance literature indicates that certain shareholder types may 
have impact on the quality of board work, effectiveness of executive compensation and 
disclosure. The understanding of the relationships between the ownership structure and 
corporate governance and the impact of different shareholder upon the quality of corporate 
governance reveal to be of crucial importance for the functioning of any public listed 
company (Allen and Gale, 2000). Particularly, the understanding of these relationships proves 
to be important for emerging markets where corporate governance notes significant 
development catching up with the world wide recognized standards and best practice. Also 
the founder control appears to be a specific potentially interesting characteristics of dominant 
individual investor who founded the enterprise and needs to share the control with other 
shareholders. Founders represent a specific type of shareholders who reveal strong control, 
the problems of responsibilities delegation, charismatic leadership, long term vision and 
emotional attachment to the firm.  As the post transition and emerging markets are 
characterized by the growing number of de novo firms, they offer an unique opportunity to 
examine the founder strategy with respect to corporate governance. Such research would face 
significant constrains with the developed economies characterized by the stable company base 
of institutional ownership.  
This paper focuses on the specific type of listed companies which remain under the control of 
the founder. The goal of the paper is to identify the corporate governance mechanisms 
adopted by founders in listed companies with respect to the way they exert control. More 
precisely the paper investigates whether founders tend to increase the control over the 
companies via use of ownership mechanisms adopting dual class shares and pyramidal 
structures and via dominating the board lowering the number of independent directors.  Using 
the hand collected data of  a sample of 100 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
the paper addresses the gap in the literature of the unique form of ownership characterized by 
the control of the founders (first generation) who need to confront the entrepreneurial spirit 
and significant dominance in management and governance in the company with the features 
of listed companies where ownership and control is shared among investors. Therefore the 
paper identifies the control patterns adopted by founders asking also about the corporate 
governance standards of the board independence. The contribution of the paper is the 
identification of the corporate governance mechanisms referring to  control such as the 
adoption of pyramidal structure, dual class shares and the presence of independent directors 
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on board. These findings add to the understanding of corporate governance in the specific 
context of founder controlled companies.  
The paper is organized as follows. The first section discussed the ownership structure from 
the perspective of potential principal agent conflict focusing on the specific case of the 
founder control over the company. The second section delivers the overview of the corporate 
governance in Poland with the reference to the transition and emerging market challenges. 
And finally the third section outlines the research methodology and results discussing the 
founders’ strategy towards control and corporate governance. The final remarks are presented 
in the conclusion section.    
 
 
2. FOUNDER CONTROL AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
The analyses on ownership structure distinguish degree of concentration (dispersed vs. 
concentrated ownership) and the shareholder identity (individual vs. institutional 
shareholders, state ownership, managerial ownership, financial and non financial) (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000). Moreover, the studies focus on the identification 
of methods enhancing control versus the shares owned realized by the use of dual class shares 
or the adoption of pyramidal structures. The analysis of ownership structure allows to relate a 
specific ownership patterns and characteristics to companies behavior, strategy, governance 
and performance. The perspective of agency theory provides framework of the analysis of the 
benefits and challenges of different ownership structure patterns for corporate governance and 
performance indicating way and means for lowering the classing principal agent conflict.  
The issue of the specific type of founder control in listed companies remains relatively 
unexplored in the literature constituting a gap in the corporate governance research. Yet 
taking into account the characteristics of the emerging markets as well as the dynamics in 
developed economies the founders control appears to be an important mechanism for 
management and governance. The existing literature on founder controlled companies derives 
from two main well established research streams of concentrated ownership as well as the 
family ownership. Concentrated ownership is perceived as a positive mechanism mitigating 
the problems of dispersed ownership such as leads to increased principal-agent conflicts as 
the residual rights of control are in the hands of executives (Monks and Minow, 2004). 
Majority shareholders do not face the limited possibility to monitor and control executives 
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and experience the problems of hidden action, hidden information and hidden intention 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Ownership concentration also 
mitigates the free rider problem as the holders of larger stakes are interested in collecting and 
processing information for the evaluation of the executives (Grossman and Hart, 1988).  
Majority shareholders may be more active than the dispersed owners and getting involved in 
the supervision and governance (Monks and Minow, 2004; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). 
The positive impact of the dominant shareholder reveals an asymptotic functions as the 
improvements in efficiency and firm value are possible to a certain point (Neun and Santerre, 
1986). The ownership concentration proves to be an important monitoring mechanism being 
the second best solution when market/ external mechanisms are not working well (Morck and 
Steier, 2005). The majority shareholder is able to internalize the costs of collecting 
information and to exert effective control over management as they possess significant stakes 
and crucial know how. The active engagement in monitoring and control appears to be an 
efficient strategy for majority shareholders. Concentrated ownership however is seen as a 
drawback to raising significant funds and risk diversification assured by the dispersed 
ownership. Some doubts refer also to the threat of the majority shareholder abusing their 
position via representatives on the board favoring them at the cost of minority shareholders 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The dominant shareholders may expropriate minority shareholders 
through a tunneling or compensation policy (Stulz, 1988), blocking dividend payout or 
limited access to information. Additionally, the ownership concentration may be exerted with 
the use pyramidal structures and dual class shares, adopted separately or jointly. Pyramids 
consist of several layers of ownership relationships characterized by complicated structure of 
cross shareholdings and mutual capital interlocks with listed companies placed at the apex of 
these structures (Perkins et al., 2008). They are the ownership type constituting of multi level 
companies with cross shareholdings which form  relations of control (Zattoni, 1998; 
Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2006). The form of a pyramid allows for the separation of control 
and cash flow rights (i.e. participation in profit) (Claessens et al., 2002) what is viewed as the 
process of leveraging control rights versus cash flow rights (Villalonga and Amit, 2007). The 
pyramidal structure assures the controlling shareholder, very often the founders or founder’s  
family, to maintain control over decision making process, to conduct value transfer within the 
group via related party transactions (Khanna and Palepu, 1999).  
 
The second research stream  of the theoretical framework on founders’ controlled companies 
derived in the vast literature on family companies which “have been recognized as an 
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important governance structure of business organizations in both developed and developing 
economies” (Chu, 2009) as more and more is known and understood on their contribution to 
the development of national economies, employment and GDP growth. Research indicate that 
family firms constitute over 35% of the S&P 500 Industrials, and families own nearly 18% of 
their firms' outstanding equity (Anderson and Reeb 2003). Yet despite the numerous presence 
of family firms still little is known about the strategic approach of families and founders to 
corporate governance (Barontini and Caprio, 2005). According to the principal agent theory 
founder and family control appear also to be important governance mechanisms as it depicts 
some degree of ownership concentration and is related to the involvement in management and 
supervision (Shleifer and Vishny 1986), vision and motivation for firm growth (Chu, 2009; 
Jayaraman et al., 2000), strong identification with the company and the decrease of the classic 
principal agent conflict (Wasserman, 2003) characterized with short-termism and myopia of 
corporate managers (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). The family control may however be seen as 
a drawback for effective corporate governance due to the dominant position in the decision 
process, the tendency to lower the board independence (Anderson and Reeb 2004 ), interest in 
non pecuniary consumption which draw scarce resources away from profitable projects, focus 
on family’s interest as the expense of firm performance and minority shareholders 
(Ramachandran and Marisetty, 2009; Anderson and Reeb 2004).  Founder who perform also 
the executive functions expose firms to a self-control problem (Schulze et al., 2001) what 
increases principal agent conflict and is detrimental to performance. As the literature review 
indicates founders do tend to adopt dual class shares or use pyramids in order to maintain 
control over the established companies. As studies in emerging markets and continental 
Europe suggest both solutions benefit the controlling shareholders, provide for lower 
transparency of listed companies and may result in the majority (controlling) shareholder 
abusing minority shareholders rights (Zattoni, 1999; Perkins et al., 2008). Pyramids are 
formed to provide the control over the company. Founders may reveal the tendency to focus 
on the family control and the internal shareholding to maintain control and may hinder the 
access to information and influence over the company for the minority shareholders. Thus, 
with the intention to increase control founders should reveal the tendency to adopt dual class 
shares and pyramidal structures. Moreover, since the board has significant power and exert 
influence over the company founders may also strive to dominate the board and lower its 
independence appointing fewer independent directors. On the basis of the literature review the 
following hypotheses were formulated: 
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H1: The adoption of a pyramidal structure is more frequent in the founders’ controlled 
companies 
H2: The adoption of dual class shares is more frequent in the founders’ controlled companies 
H3: Board independence is lower in the founders’ controlled companies 
 
 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN POLAND  
3.1. Transition reforms and privatization schemes 
The studies on ownership of Polish companies have been carried out for the last 23 years 
starting with the transition reforms and privatization schemes. There are no research 
conducted before 1989 since the pattern of ownership was exerted by the dominance of the 
state (via the State Treasury) and the Party (via its members appointed to serve on the 
executive position). The system was referred to the so called “destroyed capitalism” 
(Balcerowicz, 1995) as it faced the lack of private ownership and the lack of meaning of 
private ownership. The state control and the regime of the citizens’ ownership proved to be 
highly inefficient in the process of rights, incentives and assets allocation. The reforms 
introduced in 1989 focused on the type I reforms (macroeconomic stabilization, price 
liberalization, the reduction of direct subsidies, the breakup of trusts, the mono-bank system) 
and type II reforms referring to rebuilding institutional framework, large-scale privatization, 
the development of a commercial banking sector and effective tax system, labor market 
regulations and institutions related to the social safety net and establishment and enforcement 
of a market-oriented legal system and accompanying institutions. These reforms appear to be 
crucial from the perspective of the shift in ownership and control and hence the development 
of corporate governance structure. The privatization programs included the so called case by 
case privatization understood as the sale of the state owned company to strategic (industry) 
investor assuring for full control in the case of the direct sale or the dominant stake in the case 
of companies listed on the stock exchange. Fortunately, the stakeholders’ opposition delayed 
negotiation over the mass privatization program which to this date is viewed as the worst 
privatization method and which in the Polish case covered (luckily) only 512 companies (as 
compared to 14,000 in Russia). The popularity of management buyouts and employee stock 
ownership plans remained low and only a marginal number of state owned companies 
followed this path. The strongest impact upon the shift of ownership and control was however 
executed by the rise of the companies set up after 1989 and developed by the founders. The 
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trend strengthened significantly with the economic boom noted after Poland’s accession to the 
European Union in May 2004 supported by the start of the OTC market in 2008. The shift in 
ownership and control was additionally accompanied with the government determination to 
complete privatization process (2008-2011). According to the statistics of the Ministry of 
Treasury in terms of number of companies privatized of 8,453 state owned companies in 
1990, 7,770 have been privatized by the end of 2011 (State Treasury, 2012a). 2,307 
companies were privatized via direct privatization that appeared to be the dominant ownership 
transformation scheme, 1,753 companies were commertialized, 502 underwent indirect 
privatization, 512 were included in mass privatization program and 1,932 were covered by the 
liquidation procedure. However in the register as of January 1st, 2012 there were 530 state 
enterprises of which the state fully controls 179 (100% stake), in 47 companies the state 
operates as the dominant shareholder and in 156 it operates as the minority shareholder (State 
Treasury, 2012b). 
In sum, the Polish picture on the ownership corresponds with the characteristics of post-
transition and emerging market. Corporate governance is based upon the role of hierarchies 
(World Bank 2005a; World Bank 2005b). As noted by Berglöf and Claessens (2006) the 
crucial control role is played by large shareholders, whereas the monitoring function of 
external mechanisms (stock market, market for corporate control, reputation) is significantly 
weaker. Concentrated ownership is viewed as a result of a set of different factors such as 
privatization schemes (favoring strategic, industry investors), weaker investor protection 
(bigger stake increases safety of the investment) and the civil law tradition (Coffee, 1999). 
The potential of monitoring from the board remains unexplored and hindered. The board is 
unlikely to be influential when the controlling owner can hire and fire board members. 
Additionally, the quality of law enforcement depends critically on the quality of the general 
enforcement environment. 
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3.2. Ownership of polish listed companies 
Studies on Polish listed companies reveal the stable trend of the ownership structure over the 
whole period they were conducted after 1989. The shareholder structure of Polish companies 
shows a significant concentration of ownership characterized by the average majority 
shareholder stake estimated at 41% shares (Kozarzewski, 2003, 2006; Aluchna, 2007; 
Urbanek, 2009). The significant ownership concentration indicates that the majority of 
corporate governance challenges refer not to the problems of dispersed ownership and 
conflicts between shareholders and managers but mostly to the problems of majority 
shareholder policies toward minority investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). The ownership 
structure analysis depicts a slight evolution of the identity of the dominant shareholder which 
results from the privatization schemes and the development of the emerging market. Not 
surprisingly, the strategic foreign investor appeared to be the most frequent identity 
Dzierżanowski and Tamowicz, 2002). Strategic foreign investors were surpassed by domestic 
private and domestic strategic investors in line with the economic development and surge of 
newly set companies controlled by the founder. The ownership structure of Polish listed 
companies is presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Ownership structure of Polish companies (no. of sample companies, % of sample companies) 
Shareholder category 1st largest 2nd  largest 3rd largest 4th largest 
Executives  88 (25.1%) 49  (17.3%) 31 (15.3%) 18 (14.5%) 
Supervisory board directors 39  (11.4%) 40 (14.1%) 28 (13.8%) 12 (9.7%) 
Other individual  24  (7.1%) 24 (8.5%) 25 (12.3%) 13 (10.5%) 
Strategic foreign investor 60  (17.1%) 18 (6.4%) 8 (3.9%) 5 (4.0%) 
Financial foreign investor 6  (1.7%) 14 (4.9%) 9 (4.4%) 5 (4.0%) 
Strategic domestic investor 71 (20.3%) 26 (9.2%) 16 (7.9%) 6 (4.8%) 
Financial domestic investor 28 (8.0%) 66 (23.3%) 47 (23.2%) 42 (33.9%) 
NIF 4 (1.1%) 2 (0.7%) - - 
Pension fund 7 (2.0%) 36 (12.7%) 35 (17.2%) 20 (16.1%) 
State 14 (4.0%) 4 (1.4%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.8%) 
Cross shareholding (to be 
liquidated) 
4 (1.1%) 4 (1.4%) 3 (1.5%) 2 (1.6%) 
Dispersed ownership 7 (2.0%) - - - 
Total 350 (100%) 283 (100%) 203 (100%) 124 (100%) 
Source: compilation based on Urbanek (2009), pp. 392-393. 
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As presented in Table 1 domestic individual investors prove to be the most frequent majority 
shareholders of Polish listed companies. The individual investors often combine the role of 
majority shareholders (playing key roles via their representatives in supervisory board) and 
the role of executives at the management board. Therefore they may combine ownership and 
control exerting decision making and supervision over the company. As noted by Berglöf and 
Claessens (2006) emerging and transition economies are characterized by the ownership 
concentration and  majority shareholders’ involvement in governance and management.  The 
importance of industry investors as well as of individual investors acting via other companies 
(holding companies, financial vehicles) in the ownership structure of Polish listed companies 
led to creation of corporate groups and the development of pyramidal structures which show 
to be a popular phenomenon noted recently. Although the literature on Polish pyramidal 
structure is very rare, the initial research reveals that pyramids were identified in 50% of the 
largest listed companies (Aluchna, 2010). The development of founder control firms as well 
as the emergence of pyramidal structures provide interesting potential for the analysis of the 
ownership and control pattern in Polish listed companies.  
 
 
4. RESEARCH 
4.1. Methodology 
The research addresses the central question on the control mechanisms adopted in companies 
in which founders possess the controlling stake. The data was collected between October 
2013 and March 2013. For the purpose of the research 100 companies listed on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange, the set of 25% of overall population, were investigated. In order to assure for 
the representative sample, the analysis covered 25 largest companies out of every 100 in 
terms of market capitalization. The sample was composed of non financial companies listed 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. In the case of bankruptcy and the lack of data two companies 
were rejected and replaced by the subsequent companies on the list. As no data base was 
available all data used for the purpose of this analysis on ownership structure and board was 
hand collected. The research used the following variables: 
• Company size measured by assets (in PLN) 
• Degree of ownership concentration (concentrated from the threshold of 30% votes, 
dispersed)  
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• Founder’s control – binary variable (0,1) for the control of the founder over the 
company of at least 30% of votes 
• The size of the stake of votes controlled by the largest shareholder  
• The stake controlled by the founder – the percentage of shares controlled by the 
founder 
• The use of dual class shares – binary variable (0,1) 
• The use of a pyramidal structure – binary variable (0,1) 
The statistical analysis was conducted with the use of the standard SPSS software version 21. 
 
4.2. Results 
Descriptive statistics – the overall sample 
The descriptive statistics reveal that 71% of sample companies are characterized by the 
ownership concentration understood as the stake of the majority shareholder of 30% of votes 
and more. The general characteristics of the concentration and size variables is presented in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics 
Variable Average SD N 
The stake of the largest shareholder 42.88 21.725 100 
Assets 3062515 7847866.15 100 
Market cap  2124.36 5775.648  
 
As shown in Table 2 the average stake of the largest shareholder accounted for nearly 43% of 
votes. The breakdown of sample companies with the reference to the identity of the largest 
shareholders is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3:  The breakdown of sample companies with the reference to the identity of the largest shareholders 
Shareholder identity  Number Percent Cumulative percent 
The state 11 11.0 11.0 
Foreign investor 15 15.0 26.0 
Domestic investor 30 30.0 56.0 
Individual/ founder 29 29.0 85.0 
Financial  14 14.0 99.0 
Other  1 1.0 100 
Total  100 100  
 
The founders’ involvement in the ownership structure was noted in the case of 62% of sample 
companies while the presence of such an investor on supervisory or management board was 
revealed in the case of 36% studies firms. The average number of shareholders disclosed in 
the annual reports of sample companies was estimated at 3.5 investors. Additionally, the 
descriptive statistics reveal that in 74% of samples companies there are up to 4 notified 
shareholders disclosed in the annual report (i.e. controlling 5% or more) with the following 
breakdown: 
• One notified shareholder – 16% of companies 
• Two notified shareholders – 19% of companies 
• Three notified shareholders – 16% of companies 
• Four notified shareholders – 23% of companies 
The detailed data is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1:  The number of shareholders in the ownership structure of sample companies 
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56% companies adopted pyramidal structure as the mechanism for control while 14% used 
dual class shares. The collected data denoted the most severe structural problems of Polish 
companies – amongst sample companies 84 companies do not form board committees (except 
for the audit committee), 40 companies do not appoint independent directors, IR websites of 
24 companies were categorized as very poor.   
Statistical analysis 
To test for the first hypothesis assuming that the adoption of a pyramidal structure is more 
frequent in the founders’ controlled companies the following regression model: 
pyramid = α1assets+α2founder+ε                                       (1) 
where: 
pyramid – the use of a pyramidal structure in a company 
assets – company size measured by assets    
founder – the control of the company by its founder 
α1, α2 – model parameters  
ε – residual 
The regression results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:  The adoption of pyramidal structure and founder control - regression results 
  B SD Wald Df Sig Exp(B) 
 
Model  
Assets -0.0269 0.119 5.101 1 0.024 0.764 
Founder  -0.044 0.014 9.523 1 0.002 0.957 
Const  4.190 1.623 6.666 1 0.010 65.993 
 
As shown in Table 4 the statistically significant regression results indicate that there is a link 
between adoption of pyramids and founder control. Thus, the results support hypothesis H1. 
To test for the second hypothesis assuming that the adoption of dual class shares is more 
frequent in the founders’ controlled companies the following regression model: 
dual class shares = α1assets +α2founder 2+ ε                                                (2) 
 
where: 
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dual class shares – the adoption of dual class shares in a company 
assets – company size measured by assets    
founder – the control of the company by its founder 
α1, α2 – model parameters  
ε – residual 
The regression results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5:  The adoption of dual class shares and founder control - regression results 
  B SD Wald Df Sig Exp(B) 
 Assets -0.404 0.209 3.742 1 0.053 0.668 
Founder  0.025 0.014 3.490 1 0.062 1.026 
Const  2.766 2.573 1.156 1 0.282 15.896 
 
As shown in Table 5 the statistically significant regression results indicate that there is a link 
between adoption of dual class shares and founder control. Thus, the results support 
hypothesis H2. 
To test for the third hypothesis assuming lower board independence in the founders’ 
controlled companies the following regression model: 
 
Independent directors = α1assets +α2concentation+ α3founder + ε                                     (3) 
where: 
independent directors – the presence of independent directors on the supervisory board  
assets – company size measured by assets    
concentration – the ownership concentration (the stake of the largest shareholders above 30%  
of votes)  
founder – the control of the company by its founder 
α1, α2 – model parameters  
ε – residual 
 
Table 6:  The presence of independent directors in founder controlled companies - regression results 
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 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized 
coefficients 
t Sig 
B SD B 
Model  Const -1.775 0.676   -2.627 0.010 
Assets  0.191 0.044 0.434 4.372 0.000 
Concentration 0.151 0.182 0.079 0.826 0.411 
Founder  0.007 0.004 0.153 1.564 0.101 
 
As shown in Table 6 the statistically significant regression results indicate that there is a link 
between the board adoption and founder control. Thus, the results do not support hypothesis 
H3. 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The descriptive statistics reveal that the founders’ control remain a frequently noted 
governance mechanisms as it is noted in 62% of sample companies. In the case of 30% 
sample firms founders get involved in management and supervision indicating that the 
underdevelopment of the separation of management and control amongst Polish listed 
companies. 71 of 100 sample firms reveal concentrated ownership and the average stake of 
the largest shareholder is estimated at nearly 43% what is consistent with the previous studies. 
Since the newly founded companies are managed or supervised by the first generation of 
entrepreneurs it is expected that the pyramidal forms depict relatively simple patterns. The 
Polish market economy has been developing for the last 20 years, so has corporate 
governance what is illustrated by three final variables denoting the most severe structural 
problems of Polish companies. Amongst sample companies 84 companies do not form board 
committees (except for the audit committee provided by the hard law), 40 companies do not 
appoint independent directors, IR websites of 24 companies were very poor. Statistical 
analysis delivers additional insights of the characteristics of founders’ controlled companies 
in Poland. The analysis reveals statistically significant results indicating that the founders’ 
controlled companies appeared to be smaller in terms of market capitalization.  
The regression analyses delivered statistically significant results indicating that the founders 
tend to maintain control via ownership mechanisms using dual class shares and pyramidal 
structures. The statistically significant link supported hypotheses H1 and H2. The control of 
PAGE 80| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2015, VOL. 2, NO. 2 
the founders  is however not associated with the lower board independence. The regression 
analysis indicated just the opposite – founders controlled companies reveal statistically 
significant higher board independence measure by the number of independent directors on 
board. This finding does not support hypothesis H3. This evidence suggest that the control via 
ownership mechanisms appears to be sufficient for founders and they do not see need for 
appointing afflicted directors to the board leaving it with the recommended scope of 
independence or autonomy. An alternative explanation would however question the role of 
the board in the situation when the founder is able to change its composition immediately ad 
well as the truly it would cast doubts on the real independence status of board directors of 
Polish companies.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper focuses on the specificity of founders’ controlled companies addressing their 
overall characteristics and the standards of corporate governance. The paper attempts to fill in 
the gap in corporate governance literature since there is practically no research on corporate 
governance practices of Polish founders’ controlled companies which make for 62% of the 
sample firms. As the statistical analysis revealed as compared to their peer the founders’ 
maintain the control over the companies via ownership mechanisms of dual class shares and 
pyramidal structures but do not dominate the board with the affiliated directors lowering its 
independence. Therefore the control via ownership mechanisms appears to be sufficient for 
founders and does not impair the standard of board independence.  
The research has however several limitations. The research is based on a small sample of 100 
firms covering 25% of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The hand set data 
was collected for 2011 only. The wider time span of the data would allow to trace the 
dynamics of the founders’ control in Poland as well as depict additional statistical relations. 
The analysis uses simple statics and traces characteristics of the sample companies while a 
more complex statistical analysis would be helpful in understanding the logic of founders’ 
control in Poland.  
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